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ABSTRACT: This article explains the sudden and strong emergence of a movement in resistance to the 
presidency of Donald Trump as a counter-movement to the long-term “movementization” of the Republi-
can Party in the wake of civil rights, the Nixon “southern strategy”, and the emergence of white nativism. 
It identifies the Resistance as posing three distinct challenges for both citizens and scholars of participation 
and conflict: the political opportunity challenge, the coalitional challenge, and the radicalization/ institu-
tionalization challenge. The article situates the Resistance in a historical and comparative context, high-
lights its dilemmas as it faces the focal point of a populist/nativist President, and asks if it is an effective 
countermovement to the white nativist movement that supports him. 
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The rapid emergence of what has come to be called “the Resistance” to Donald 
Trump startled both activists and academics in the United States. Perhaps its resilience 
and its impact on the electoral contest of November 2018 were even more striking. As 
Martha McKenna, a Democratic Party consultant wrote of the party’s wave of new, ma-
jority-female candidates who arose out of the anti-Trump resistance. These grass-roots 
candidates came out of non-political, non-traditional networks, meaning that they’re 
running very different kinds of campaigns than we’ve ever seen. When a state legisla-
tor runs for Congress, that’s a formula we know. But when a nurse or a mom or a 
young veteran decides to run, their campaign looks and feels different, and in 2018, 
there’s a lot of power in that.1 
The diversity of the Resistance on many different issues has given citizens a cause for 
optimism, tempering their fear for the future of American democracy. But it has also 
faced scholars of social movements and contentious politics with a series of challenges. 
Among the most serious challenges are these: 
 
 The political opportunity challenge: Election and Inauguration day protests 
against newly-elected leaders are now a routine part of life, but the election of Donald 
Trump generated a cycle of contention comparable to the one that Americans experi-
enced during the period of Civil Rights and the movement against Vietnam War.2 Was 
this the result of the threat of Trumpism or the opportunity his election offered for the 
revival of a progressive movement that had lain dormant for decades? 
 The coalitional challenge: In the Resistance against the Trump presidency we 
see both cooperation among different groups and dispersion around diverse goals. 
Most notably, some people turned out to protect the institutions of liberal democracy 
while others wanted to tear down the institutions that produced the Trump presiden-
 
1
 Elena Schneider, “Something Has Actually Changed; Women, Minorities, First-Time Candidates Drive 
Democratic House Hopes, Politico, September 11
th
, 2018 retrieved at  
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/11/white-men-democratic-house-candidates-813717 
2
 Whether this movement will extend over the same long period of time as its forebears remains to be 
seen. In July 2018, Erica Chenoweth and Jeremy Pressman found that between 71,502 and 73,483 people 
showed up at political events, the lowest that their crowd-sourced estimates found since December 2017. 
See Chenoweth and Pressman’s “In July the Trump-era Wave of Protests Started Taking a back Seat to 
Campaign Rallies,” retrieved at https://washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp2018/10/19/in-july-
the-trump-era-wave-of-protests-started-taking-a-back-seat-to-campaign/rallies/  
 




cy. In this internal dialectic, which tendency is most likely to win out – conflict over 
goals and means or unity around the focal point of a common enemy? 
 The radicalization/institutionalization challenge: Related to this, as those who 
want to protect the institutions of democracy gravitate into the party system, will 
those whose goal was to tear down these institutions move into anti-systemic postures 
in a mutual dance of radicalization with Trump’s more extreme supporters? Does radi-
calization on the Left advance the cause of defending democracy or does it trigger an 
even more potent movement of nativism on the political Right? 
In what follows, we will focus most closely on these three challenges. But first, we 
must place both Trump and the Resistance in historical and comparative perspective. 
We will argue that Trumpism can only be understood in the light of “movementization” 
inside the American party system over the past half century and its relation to race. 
This sets if off from most European right-populist parties that have emerged outside of 
the institutional party system3 and provides it with reserves of power and organization 
that most of these parties lack. This leaves the anti-Trump movement with political op-
portunities, but also with major challenges. 
 
 
2. Populism with a difference 
 
The election of Donald Trump in November 2016 led to a paradox: as Europeans well 
know – but Americans often forget -- a democratic election can lead to a threat to the 
constitutional order from within that order. To understand how this has happened, we 
must overcome two opposite temptations: the first is to see Trump as something sui 
generis; and the second, to see the movement he represents as no more than an Amer-
ican version of recent trends in Europe. Our approach leads us to look both compara-
tively at other cases of rightwing populism and at the relationship between movement 
activism and electoral politics in America’s recent history. Drawing on our co-edited 
book - The Resistance (2018) - and especially on the contributions of Doug McAdam 
and Kenneth Roberts to that book,4 we look both at recent developments in Europe 
and at the key role of race in shaping both America’s political polarization and Trump’s 
victory. We see the anti-Trump Resistance as a counter-movement – not unlike the 
ones that one of us – with Suzanne Staggenborg – analyzed in the recent American past 
 
3
 The rise of Victor Orban in Hungary and of Jaroslaw Kaczynski in Poland are obvious exceptions. 
4
 In addition to their contributions to The Resistance, see Roberts (2017) and McAdam and Kloos (2014).  




(Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).5 As such, it is both tied to the erratic moves of its an-
tagonist and is able to employ the remarkable diversity of the resources it commands. 
We also see it as a compound movement, unified in its focus on the outsize figure of 
Donald Trump but scattered in its goals and its composition. 
 
 
2.1 Like Europe but not Europe 
  
As numerous observers have pointed out, in recent years, Europe has experienced 
an extraordinary wave of populism, brought on by the Great Recession, by the austeri-
ty policies that governments produced in response to it, and by the wave of refugees 
that followed. In Hungary, Poland, Germany and – in different forms – in Italy, Austria, 
and Britain, nativist currents and populist parties have threatened – and in some cases 
overwhelmed – the liberal consensus that dominated European politics through the 
turn of the new century (Roberts 2018). 
But while Trumpism shows striking similarities to rightwing populist parties in Eu-
rope, as Roberts writes, most of the movements that gave rise to those parties arose 
outside of, and in competition with the mainstream party system. What sets the United 
States apart, at least in comparison with its long-standing democratic counterparts in 
Europe, is what Roberts sees as: 
 
(1) The steady infusion of varied right-wing social movements into a mainstream 
conservative party, rather than a smaller far-right ethno-nationalist “niche” party, and 
(2)  The de facto transformation of that mainstream party into a vehicle for the 
election of an antiestablishment outsider who is openly contemptuous of democratic 
norms and procedures (Roberts 2018, 54). 
 
The insertion of Trump’s movement into the institutional party system of a robust 
democracy has both given the Republican Party unusual opportunities and faced it with 
difficult problems. The opportunities arise from the fact that Trump inherited, and has 
been able to exploit, an existing panoply of support organizations and a political class 
that became a willing executioner of most of his policies. The problems arise from that 
fact that most Republican officials – though firmly planted on the right – are more con-
 
5
 Note that we use the term as it has been employed in the social movement literature summarized in 
Meyer and Staggenborg (1996), and not in the Polanyian sense of a historical counter-trend to market 
economics.  




ventional conservatives, and that each of his outrageous moves – while delighting his 
populist base—has triggered a counter-movement against him and his administration. 
 While the two wings of the Trumpian coalition - nationalist and conservative - came 
together easily over tax cuts for the very wealthy, they divided over a number of other 
issues, like health care, immigration, Trump’s would-be Russian alliance and his dalli-
ance with the Saudi monarchy, international trade and (more quietly) his injudicious 
attacks on women, minorities and the press. In the face of the new president’s con-
stant stream of initiatives and outrages, it was only the ferocity and loyalty of his 
movement base that kept congressional Republicans in line – as several who had op-
posed him learned at the cost of their political futures.  
The 2018 midterm elections revealed both the opportunities and the costs to the 
Republicans of the Trumpian presidency. While the GOP held onto the Senate – indeed, 
increasing its majority in the upper chamber – it lost control of the House of Repre-
sentatives, largely due to anti-Trump sentiments. The Republicans gained two seats in 
the Senate, and will govern that house with a thin majority, while the Democrats 
gained 40 seats in the House of Representatives, and will control it with a comfortable 
majority.6 While the Republicans continue to run the majority of state governments, 
the Democrats won the governors’ seats in seven states, including Kansas, historically a 
very conservative state, and took control of six state legislatures.7 State-level gains will 
be especially important when it comes to redistricting after the 2020 census, in which 
the state legislature gets to decide on changes in district lines, a power that the Repub-
licans used to their advantage to gerrymander the electorate after the 2010 election. 
While the election was a testament to organizing against the Trump presidency, and 
the Democrats won substantial gains, it was hardly an unambiguous rebuke of the 
president. The defeated Republicans were almost all among the most moderate mem-
bers of the House caucus, many of whom had modestly resisted some of the admin-
istration’s policy initiatives in deference to their constituents. The remaining Republi-
can contingent in the House is a bit smaller, but is substantially more unified in defer-
ence to the president. In the Senate, it will be somewhat more extreme. Two mild Re-
publican critics of the Trump administration retired rather than face committed Trum-
pian primary voters. At least three of the new Republican senators are far more com-
mitted to Trump personally and politically than the moderate Democrats they replaced 
in Indiana, Missouri, and North Dakota. The slightly expanded majority will weaken the 
 
6
  https://www.google.com/search?q=election+results&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&hl=en-us&client=safari. 
7
  On the governor’s races, see https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/results-
governor-elections.html. For the state legislative results, see https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/11/7/18071410/democrat-state-legislature-colorado-minnesota-election-results 




leverage of the most moderate remaining Republicans, Susan Collins (Maine) and Lisa 
Murkowski (Alaska), who had frustrated efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act. The 
Senate now has a working majority of Trump acolytes. 
The election realigned the institutional battles and political realities in Washington, 
all in ways that strengthened the influence of movement partisans in each party. Dem-
ocrats, who gained control of the House, will be under pressure from the grassroots to 
challenge the administration aggressively on matters of policy and ethics. Meanwhile, 
the election demonstrated the futility for Republicans in trying to keep a political dis-
tance from the president; moderates who criticized the president lost their seats. Re-
publican politicians learned that Trump’s blessing was powerful within the base of the 
Party, and was essential for winning office in large swaths of the United States.  
Trumpism was weakened but not defeated. What needs to be explained, then, is 
how a phenomenon that is common to the long-standing democracies of Europe 
stands out from its European counterparts, and has been shaped by America’s institu-
tions and patterns of contentious politics in general. It is only against the background 
of these differences that we can understand the emergence, the extraordinary vitality, 
and the complex problems faced by the anti-Trump Resistance.  
 
 
3. Race and Movementization 
 
Two factors seem to us to be central in understanding the Trumpian phenomenon: 
race and the partial movementization of the party system over the past few decades. 
These two features are often treated as if they were distinct compartments in Ameri-
can politics, but in fact they have been deeply imbricated with one another since the 
1950s (McAdam and Kloos 2014, ch. 3). Although there are striking parallels with the 
rise of anti-immigrant populism in Europe, race is – if anything – more deeply embed-
ded in American politics, and the rise of movement politics coming out of the civil 
rights movement and the opposition to it provided it with a new and more polarizing 
edge. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Civil Rights movement reached wide public visibility, set-
ting an agenda for mainstream politics for the next few decades. Like the current Re-
sistance, it featured both institutional and non-institutional facets; the first when the 
NAACP launched a legal campaign to end school segregation in the 1950s, and the sec-
ond when a group of college students launched the sit-in movement that spread across 
the South in the early 1960s. Though it found grudging support from the Kennedy ad-
ministration, the movement operated independently of the Democratic Party, and – in 




fact – in its early days it enjoyed more congressional support from the Republicans 
than from the Democratic Party, which included a powerful southern segregationist 
wing.8 
Though much of the historical literature has focused on the successes of the free-
dom movement, we must not forget that the movement triggered a countermovement 
of segregationists – some of them quite violent – and led to the broader “Southern 
strategy” of the Republican Party in national politics (Phillips 1969). Although the overt 
aim of that strategy was to encourage white southerners to shift allegiance to the Re-
publicans, the adjective “southern” is partly a misnomer, because Richard Nixon, who 
first successfully executed the strategy, exploited and promoted white racial resent-
ment throughout the country. Nixon’s 1968 campaign, for example, exploited the fear 
of white Americans of the riots that tore apart many of the nation’s northern cities in 
the summers of 1965-67 and following the 1968 murder of Martin Luther King Jr.  
Race lay at the crossroads of both the southern and law-and-order facets of Nixon’s 
strategy, one that ambitious Republican politicians hastened to adopt. To this brew, 
President Ronald Reagan added a potent anti-government element, focusing on the 
supposed advantages that African-Americans and other minorities have gained at the 
expense of tax-paying middle-class white voters. The Trump movement has equally 
used race to cross regional lines in its call to “make America great again.”  For example, 
during the first year of Trump’s presidency, confederate flags began to appear on peo-
ple’s lawns in rural areas throughout the North.9 
           This familiar story has often been retold by political party specialists in the 
United States, but, in their emphasis on elections, they have mainly overlooked a fun-
damental factor:10 In both the Democratic and the Republican parties, these develop-
ments were part of a broader “movementization” within the parties’ bases which laid 
the groundwork for the current polarization of American politics. As McAdam and 
Kloos put it: 
 
By revitalizing and legitimating the social movement form, the civil rights 
movement of the early 1960s reintroduced…centrifugal pressures to American 
 
8
 For example, as McAdam and Kloos point out (2014, 79), 107 House Democrats and 18 Senate Democrats 
voted against the Civil Rights act of 1957, compared to only 19 House Republicans and none in the Senate. 
9




 Important exceptions are the books of Daniel Schlozman (2015) and Samuel Rosenfeld (2018). 
 




politics. Or more accurately, it was one movement – civil rights – and one pow-
erful countermovement—white resistance…that began to force the parties to 
weigh the costs and benefits of appealing to the median voter against the stra-
tegic imperative of responding to mobilized movement elements at the ideolog-
ical margins (2014, 10-11).  
 
But it wasn’t only the social movement revival in the 1960s that mattered. Critically, 
the post-Watergate campaign reforms of the 1970s, which limited the influence of par-
ty elites on their own nomination processes, made the support of mobilized citizen 
groups far more critical than they had been in the past (Berry 2000). From the ill-fated 
McGovern nomination in the 1972 presidential election to the infiltration of the Tea 
Party into the Republican congressional delegation after Barack Obama’s election in 
2008, mobilized minorities played a critical role in the nomination process and – be-
cause they are typically more extreme than the average party member - in the polari-
zation of the two major parties.  
But although both parties passed parallel primary reforms, there was a difference in 
how they responded to this growing grassroots mobilization and polarization.  While 
the Democrats remained a coalition of interest groups, the Republicans were drawn 
together by an increasingly focused conservative ideology (Grossman and Hopkins 
2016). This asymmetry meant that while the Democrats continued to have to build alli-
ances across interest group lines - and were often hampered by the inter-group ten-
sions in their coalition - the Republicans relied increasingly on resentment to govern-
ment in general and to those who benefited from government initiatives in particular. 
This included both domestic minorities, suspected of taking advantage of government 
largesse, and, increasingly, immigrants, Latinos, and Muslims. Given this ideological 
coloration, militant groups had a greater chance of taking over the Republican Party 
than the corresponding movement in the more diverse and group-centered Democrat-
ic Party – which is what happened in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election, 
when Trump drew on these militant minorities to defeat a dozen more conventional 
Republican candidates. 
This transformation took a long time to become evident. The developing Republican 
coalition had to balance the concerns of culturally-conservative working class whites 
with the class interests of large business and the ideological priorities of smaller but 
prolific libertarian and neoconservative contingents. This was difficult to accomplish; 
from the first stirrings of the religious right in the 1970s, the party generally prioritized 
the class interests of business, offering rhetorical concessions—coupled with judicial 
appointments—to the cultural conservatives, adopting hawkish foreign policies, and 




largely taking the support of libertarians for granted. In contrast, the Democrats’ coali-
tion was always more unstable, complicated, varied, and therefore more contingent. 
That party’s electoral success depended upon constantly renegotiating alliances in dif-
ferent parts of the country and in the vacillating turnout of lower-class and minority 
voters during a period in which the union movement was in decline. In areas where or-
ganized labor maintained some sway, it was a critical component of electoral cam-
paigns. Black, Latino, and Asian ethnic contingents stepped in for the old white ethnic 
constituencies of earlier days in other areas of the country. Issue specialists concerned 
with such matters as reproductive rights, environmental protection, or civil liberties 
and criminal justice reform were substantial contingents in some places, along with a 
smattering of ideological liberals virtually everywhere. As the Republican Party moved 
rightward, the Democrats also competed effectively in many places on the promise of 
effective technocratic administration. The potential of a broad alliance consistently 
loomed on the horizon, but achieving and sustaining it was always a work in progress. 
Barack Obama’s election in 2008 did demonstrate that such a broad and diverse 
Democratic interest group coalition could succeed, but it also increased the potency of 
the anti-state, anti-Black ideology in the Republican Party. In addition to reviving the 
race issue among Republicans, Obama’s victory produced an ambitious Affordable Care 
Act, which brought out older white voters enraged at the prospect of a government 
“takeover” of health care. The Obama Administration also took an explicitly activist ap-
proach to social and economic policy, presiding over new consumer protections, in-
creased regulation of the financial sector and, to varying degrees, support for women, 
and ethnic, racial, and sexual minorities.  
The faces of the Democratic leadership reflected these policies: in overseeing finan-
cial reform, for example, President Obama worked with Nancy Pelosi, the first woman 
to serve as Speaker of the House, and Representative Barney Frank, openly Jewish, gay, 
and chair of the House Financial Services Committee. Obama also appointed record 
numbers of women and minorities to visible positions, a fact that did not escape the 
attention of white Republican voters and their representatives, and eventually came 
around to supporting same-sex marriage, the most visible success of a social move-
ment in America since the civil rights movement (Dorf and Tarrow 2014).   
 Beginning in 2010, the Tea Party rebellion, followed by its insertion into the Repub-
lican Party, carried both traditional economic conservative and white populist messag-
es and was unified by opposition to the new president and his race (Skocpol and Wil-
liamson 2011; Parker and Barreto 2013). Even before Trump entered the scene, Repub-
licans found that they could benefit from the mobilized anger of white voters driven by 




racial resentment11 who had deep differences with the government in Washington. The 
Republican Party began to play to a populist undercurrent that would prove dangerous, 
first to Democrats, then to mainstream Republicans, and ultimately to democracy it-
self.  
It was that undercurrent that Trump was able to exploit — first, in his transparently 
fictional but frequently repeated claim that Obama was born in Kenya, then in his at-
tacks on Mexicans and Muslims, and finally on his assaults on the press and on truth 
itself. We will examine the institutionalization of movement politics below, but it needs 
to be emphasized that Trump’s major weapon against both the Republican elite and 
the Democrats is, at this writing, his unshakable movement base and its personal con-
nection to its charismatic leader. 
 
 
4. Movement/Countermovement Interaction 
 
This was a deeper connection than anyone imagined when Trump, in June, 2015, 
announced his ambition to run for the presidency. This does not mean that all of 
Trump’s voters had similar policy and political profiles: on the contrary, as Emily Ekins 
(2017) shows in her analysis of a massive Democracy Fund survey, there were at least 
five distinguishable sectors of the Trump constituency: what she calls “staunch con-
servatives,” “free marketeers,” “American preservationists,” “anti-elites,” and “the dis-
engaged.” Each group had somewhat different motives for supporting the Trump 
movement and a different degree of loyalty to its leader.12 But at the core of his con-
stituency were many voters whose fealty to Trump was orthogonal to these policy and 
political profiles, involving a personal connection that was reminiscent of European 
populist traditions.  
This core of Trump’s support is “cult-like”. For example, Mark Lee, who appeared on 
a CNN panel in the midst of the Mueller investigation into campaign collusion with the 
Russians, declared; “If Jesus Christ gets down off the cross and told me Trump is with 
Russia, I would tell him, 'Hold on a second. I need to check with the president if it's 
 
11
 See Abramowitz and Webster (2015) and Abramowitz (2017). 
12
  Ekins (2017). The report is summarized in Karlyn Bowman, “Who Were Donald Trump’s Voters? Now 
We Know,” Forbes Opinion, June 23, 2017. www.forbes.com/sites/bowmanmarsico/2017/06/23/who-
were-trumps-voters-now-we-know/2/#16caae4e2d08. 




true’.”13 Although not every supporter was as devotedly loyal to Trump as Lee, a cult-
like personal loyalty seems to have infected a large part of the Republican base, making 
it impermeable to rational argument. As outgoing Republican Senator Bob Corker 
complained, “We're in a strange place. It's becoming a cultish thing, isn't it?” “It's not a 
good place for any party to have a cult-like situation as it relates to a President that 
happens to be purportedly of the same party.”14 
The depth of Trump’s “cult-like” support was revealed when, in June, 2018, his ad-
ministration’s new “zero tolerance” policy toward refugees from Central America 
emerged. As is well-known, that policy led to the forced separation of parents and chil-
dren at the border and to the incarceration of many of the children, including even in-
fants, in scattered detention sites around the country. While Democrats, Republicans, 
civil liberties groups, medical associations, and religious leaders were appalled at the 
policy, Trump’s loyal supporters continued to support it. As measured by the Gallup 
daily presidential approval tracking poll in June, 2018, Trump averaged 87 percent job 
approval from Republicans in his second year in office. While he was under severe criti-
cism for his family separation policy, his approval rating rose to 90 percent among Re-
publicans.15 
This was not the first time a movement-like following has infiltrated a major Ameri-
can party. Going back to the Civil War, when abolitionists combined with “free-soil” 
advocates to create the Republican Party of Lincoln, American parties have long been 
vulnerable to movementization. Part of the reason for this is their extreme decentrali-
zation and weak central direction, while another is the fact that the electoral system 
affords few opportunities for third parties to flourish. As a result, movements that 
would create an independent party in Europe’s multiparty systems are virtually forced 
to enter the two-party system (Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus, 1996). If there is some-
thing different about the Trumpian movement, it is that it represents a challenge to the 
norms and institutions of a pluralist democracy, one that offers eerie echoes of histori-
cal authoritarian movements and regimes, both in the United States and abroad (Rob-
erts 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).  
 
13
 Avery Anapol, “Trump voter: If Jesus Christ told me Trump colluded with Russia, I’d check with Trump,” 
The Hill, November 21st., 2017. http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/361158-trump-voter-if-
jesus-christ-told-me-trump-colluded-with-russia-id 
14
 “Read the Executive Order Trump Signed on Family Separation,” New York Times, June 20, 2018. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/us/politics/read-executive-order-trump-family-separation.html. 
15
 Jeremy W. Peters, “As Critics Assail President, His Supporters Tighten their Embrace,” New York Times, 
June 24, 2018, p. 19. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/us/politics/republican-voters-trump.html. 




In his historical study, American Demagogues (1954), Reinhart Luthin offered a list of 
characteristics that he found in the public careers of American demagogues of the last 
century -- those "masters of the masses" who, in their aspirations for political place 
and power, pandered to the passions and prejudices, rather than the reason, of the 
populace, and performed all manner of crowd-captivating tricks, only to betray the 
people who had supported them. Luthin did not compare his list of American dema-
gogues with those of other countries; but there are striking similarities between figures 
like Benito Mussolini and the behavior of Donald Trump in his first period in office (Tar-
row 2018). 
The ideological cast of the Republican Party is not identical to the beliefs – such as 
they are – of Donald Trump. Indeed, he has few fully-developed ideological positions 
and is capable of taking opposing policy positions from one day to the next. But his 
election gave the Republican right - and especially its former Tea Party faction, now re-
named “the Freedom Caucus” - the opportunity to pass the anti-regulatory legislation 
its members had long advocated and to remain silent as Trump began to erode the 
administrative state and pack the courts with right-wing lawyers. It also gave them li-
cense to ignore the assaults that democracy was facing at the hands of the new admin-
istration. A few Republicans – mainly those who had decided to leave office – and 
many civil servants warned publicly about the new administration’s outrages. But most 
– terrified by the expected revenge of the President and his devoted movement base - 
suppressed whatever doubts they had about the costs of his policies.  
 
 
4.1 The Resistance Countermovement16  
 
If Donald Trump can be usefully seen as a movement leader who mobilized a mass 
following with charismatic appeals, this means that the Resistance that opposes him 
operates as a countermovement.   A countermovement we define, simply, as “a 
movement that makes contrary claims simultaneously to those of the original move-
ment.”17 This puts the emphasis on interaction between movement and counter-
movement. As Meyer and Staggenborg write: 
 
16
 This section draws on the substantive chapters in our co-edited book, The Resistance (2018). For greater 
detail and more examples, the reader is directed to that book, and in particular to the chapters on the 
women’s movement by Berry and Chenoweth (2018), on immigrant and Latino mobilization by Zepeda 
Millán and Wallace (2018), on the climate change movement by Fisher (2018), on the lawyers’ movement 
by Dorf and Chu (2018), and on the Indivisible movement by Brooker (2018) and Han and Oyakawa (2018). 
17
 Earlier authors regarded countermovements as essentially reactionary and directed more at state and 
society than at the precursor movement, and indeed, the most important work on countermovements in 





Movements …have a “demonstration effect” for political countermovements 
–showing that collective action can effect (or resist) change in particular as-
pects of society. Movements thus create their own opposition, which some-
times takes countermovement form. Once a countermovement is mobilized, 
movement and countermovement react to one another (1996, 1632).  
 
Meyer and Staggenborg list three conditions that promote the rise of counter-
movements:  
 
 first, that the movement [it opposes] shows signs of success;  
 second, that the interests of some populations are threatened by movement 
goals;  
 and, third, that political allies are available to aid oppositional mobilization.  
 
All three of these claims apply to the current situation in the United States: Trump 
has been remarkably successful in holding onto a solid phalanx of his 2016 supporters; 
his policies seriously threaten a number of population groups; and the countermove-
ment has been able to attract the support of a number of political allies. Whatever 
emerges from the “Resistance” – and we will only know this during the second half of 
Trump’s term in office -- the United States is in the middle of a major cycle of conten-
tion, with alliances between proximate groups, seeking and creating political opportu-
nities, and intersecting institutional and non-institutional facets (Tarrow 2011; 2018). 
The reciprocal relationship between the Trumpian movement and the countermove-
ment that opposes him both offers the Resistance political opportunities but also 
leaves it susceptible to major risks.  
Both opportunities and risks expand in periods of generalized disruption, which is 
what the Trump presidency has produced. In order to better understand the interac-
tion between the Resistance countermovement and the movement it has been created 
to oppose, in the next three sections, we will lay out the challenges we outlined in our 
introduction: the political opportunity challenge, the coalitional challenge, and the rad-
icalization/institutionalization challenge. Drawing on the contributions to our co-edited 
 
the United States is about conservative movements. But more recently, many authors have argued that a 
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5. The political opportunity challenge 
 
The mobilization of citizens is contingent upon perceptions of opportunities — the 
assessment of the likelihood that collective action could achieve desired results or 
stave off unwanted outcomes. Organizers, overly optimistic by disposition (Gamson 
and Meyer 1996), often overstate threats and political prospects, hoping to convince 
others to join in their efforts. In doing so, they engage the political imagination and 
moral courage of their audiences, but they also risk wasting efforts and ultimately fos-
tering disappointment and disaffection. Opportunities are the reverse side of threats 
(Goldstone and Tilly 2001), both of which can entice a movement to form. The conjunc-
ture of political opportunities, perceived and material, present difficult challenges to 
both the Trump administration and its Resistance challengers, challenges that each 
side has, with difficulty, tried to navigate. We can’t really understand these challenges 
without recognizing the political structures established in the American Constitution 
centuries ago.  
  
      
5.1 A System of Veto Points  
 
Wary of monarchical tyranny, and frightened of mass democracy, the American 
founders negotiated the creation of a set of governmental structures that would invite 
political engagement, but would also make concerted government action time-
consuming and difficult to achieve. A large republic governed by both state and federal 
authorities, with powers divided across both levels of government and distinct political 
institutions at the federal level, makes it relatively easy for movements to find sites in 
which to mobilize, but very difficult for them to win effective control of the levers of 
policy making. Both the Trump contingent and its organized Resistance have faced the 
built-in veto points of American politics (Tsebelis 2002). 
Trump’s electoral campaign displayed proud ignorance of the institutional and legal 
obstacles facing the reforms he promised that only he could deliver. Even before taking 
office, his administration struggled to develop plans to make good on new policies on 
health care, immigration, and infrastructure investment. The signature promise of a 
ban on Muslims entering the United States encountered legal obstacles the Admin-




istration was ill-prepared to navigate, and triggered immediate resistance. Haphazardly 
implemented, the Trump plan faced citizen protest at the airports, a raft of legal chal-
lenges, and an unusual flood of lawyers volunteering their time to help people caught 
in transit (Dorf and Chu 2018).  Although a travel ban was ultimately narrowly upheld 
by the Supreme Court more than a year after its appearance, that ban reflected rounds 
of revisions, qualifications, and attenuations.  
Although Trump has frequently bragged about his administration’s “amazing” suc-
cesses, most of his campaign promises were either defeated or fell by the wayside. For 
example, his promise to repeal the Affordable Care Act, a core issue for Republicans for 
nearly a decade, faltered in the Senate, and by the time of the 2018 midterms, Repub-
lican candidates were falling over themselves to declare their commitment to support 
for funding for pre-existing conditions. At the same time, meaningful international 
agreements on security or trade proved easier to criticize than to negotiate. Promised 
cuts in federal spending were scuttled on the shores of Congressional concerns with 
electoral constituents—and math. As for Trump’s campaign promises to afford working 
mothers help to pay for day care and cities to revive infrastructure, legislation on these 
issues never emerged. 
Why is this? To some extent, Trump had to navigate the same institutional obstacles 
that challenge all new presidents, but he came to the task with less patience, less so-
phistication, and a less competent staff than his predecessors, and with a mass base 
that was remarkably indifferent to the twists and turns of his policy decisions. Far earli-
er than those predecessors, he turned to aspects of the job that were less encumbered 
with the need for technical expertise and political savvy: rhetoric, executive rule-
making, secret dealing, and politically-inspired pardons. Unable to stop opponents 
from publishing criticism of his administration, he had to satisfice by trying to delegiti-
mate them—and the mass media more generally. Such efforts produced stalemates, at 




5.2 Seizing and Making Opportunities18 
 
At least as much as its policies, the Administration’s rhetoric has been a boon to the 
Resistance, which has been extraordinarily successful in mobilizing opposition to it; its 
efforts were likely critical in stopping the repeal of the Affordable Care Act in 2017 and 
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in forcing the administration to re-unite the families it had separated at the border, or 
at least to make a show of doing so. But more fundamentally, the Resistance has been 
successful in using America’s inherited institutions to create opportunities for itself.  
Take the near-monarchical institution of the presidential inauguration: in the face of 
the assembling of Trump’s supporters in Washington, DC to celebrate Trump’s inaugu-
ration on January 20th, 2017, a  coalition of his opponents was able to bring together 
an enormous turnout against the newly-elected President the following day, both in 
the nation’s capital and around the country (Berry and Chenoweth 2018). That “Wom-
an’s March” was sparked by outrage over the new President’s disparaging attitude to 
women, but its members’ claims went far beyond feminist claims (Fisher 2018). From a 
quickly constructed “event coalition”, the Women’s March grew into a loosely-linked 
organization that continued to fuel participation at a series of other protest events 
with participants and organizational leadership.  
Dana Fisher’s studies of movement events in Washington from January 2017 
through to the “March for Our Lives” in June 2018 lend support to this model. Fisher 
(2019) found large majorities of female participants at these events (also see Putnam 
and Skocpol 2018). This was followed by a massively attended “March for Science,” a 
“People’s Climate March,” a “March for Racial Justice,” and a second Women’s March 
in January 2018. The timeline in Figure 1, reproduced from Fisher’s work, lays out only 
the nationally-oriented protests that followed Trump’s election that she surveys. But as 
the work of Erica Chenoweth and Jeffrey Pressman’s crowd-sourced archive shows, 
these Washington events were only the barest minimum of a wave of protest events – 
both national and local – that continued through the first two years of the Trump pres-
idency.19 
Following a tried-and-true American practice, almost immediately, a major segment 
of the Resistance organizations turned to the routes of influence afforded by the 
founders, particularly, the midterm elections two years away. This was a political op-
portunity that both radicals and moderates on the Left knew they had to seize. The  
midterms produced a surge of women candidates and supporters across the country. 
According to the New York Times: 
 
…progressive candidates running outsider campaigns powered by strong 
personal narratives and women’s activism that began with massive marches 
the day after President Trump’s inauguration and has grown through protests 
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against gun violence, the stripping away of the Affordable Care Act and immi-
gration policies that divide candidates.20 
 
Figure 1 - Major Nationally-Oriented Protest Events, January 21, 2017-November 6th, 2018 
Source: Dana Fisher, "Some Updates on American Resistance." 
http://americanresistancebook.com/2018/03/07/some-updates-on-american-resistance/ November 7th, 2018. 
 
As of mid-November, 2018, 235 women had won primaries for election to the House 
and 22 to the Senate, breaking a record set in 2012, of which 102 won their contests. 
Not only that: 130 candidates of color won primary contests, of whom 45 won their 
contests, as did 158 first-time candidates, of whom 35 won their seats.21 Table 1 sum-
marizes the congressional data for total numbers of women who filed, and who won or 
lost primary elections, and the total number who ran in the midterm elections in No-
vember, 2018. We present the primary data because these are most likely to have 
tapped into the new women’s militancy that grew out of the women’s march. 
The mobilization in the streets and the new movement-oriented candidacies for of-
fice energized and radicalized the political base of the Democratic Party. Moreover, so-
cial movement activists, ranging from former Clinton supporters to Indivisible to the 
young gun control crusaders from Florida all focused their efforts squarely on the mid-
term elections. Their energy, underscored by provocations from the Oval Office, pro-
 
20
 Kate Zernike, “Hope Mixes with Caution in a Year Women are Breaking the Rules,” New York Times, June 
30th, 2018, p. A11. https://nyti.ms/2IC2Hlu. 
21
 Schneider, data as of September 11, 2018, in https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/11/white-men-
democratic-house-candidates-813717. Final figures are from 
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2018/women-rule-candidate-tracker/ 




duced record financial contributions to Democratic candidates for office, mostly 
through numerous small donations.22 Democrats brought young people to the polls in 
record numbers, mobilizing ethnic and racial minorities as well.23  Even more impres-
sive were the number of women who won their congressional elections – as many as 
113 in the House, beating the number of successful women candidates in the “Year of 
the Woman” of 1992. 
 
Table 1 - Women Candidates in the 2018 Midterm Elections, by Chamber and Status  
 
U.S House* 
Total Filed to date** 476 356D, 120R 
Lost Primary 231 164D, 67R 
Won Primary*** 235 183D, 52R 
Likely candidates not yet filed -- -- 
Total still in the running 237 185D, 52R 
 
U.S Senate 
Total Filed to date** 53 31D, 22R 
Lost Primary 30 16D, 147R 
Won Primary*** 22 15D, 7R 
Likely candidates not yet filed -- -- 
Total still in the running 23 15D, 8R 
Source: Center for American Women and Politics, “2018 Summary of Women Candidates,” October 21, 2018. 
http://cawp.rutgers.edu/potential-candidate-summary-2018. 
 
 In New Mexico and Kansas, two Native American women won seats in Congress 
in traditionally Republican states; 
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 In Michigan and Minnesota, Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omer became the first 
Muslim women to serve in Congress; 
 In New York and Iowa, the two youngest women ever elected to Congress took 
their seats; 
 In deep-red Texas, Veronica Escobar and Sylvia Garcia became the state’s first 
two Latina congresswomen 
 In Massachusetts, Ariana Pressley became that state’s first black congress-
woman.24 
 
But the visible energy of the ascendant Democrats inspired Trump’s supporters to 
turn out in great numbers as well. The result was an increased polariziation and purifi-
cation within each party in the areas of its strength. Although the bargain of higher 
turnout and greater civic engagement across the political spectrum is better for Demo-
crats in general, it is not unambiguous or cost-free. Conservatives and nationalists see a 
political threat and are responding, at the polls, in legislatures, and, most disturbingly, 
in the streets. 
Although the Democrats made electoral gains, to translate that electoral passion in-
to policy, they face not only their opponents, but also the institutional obstacles the 
Founders built into the Constitution. The first is the Electoral College, which delivered 
the presidency to Donald Trump when the popular vote did not—despite the best ef-
forts of his political opponents. The second is the misappropriation of seats in relation 
to population in the Senate, whereby a state like North Dakota, with a population of 
just over 755 thousand, has the same number of Senators as California, with close to 
40 million. The third is the practice in the vast majority of states that allows state legis-
lators to determine the boundaries of election districts, which permitted Republican 
legislators, who gained control of a majority of states in 2010, to “gerrymander” minor-
ities and Democrats into districts in which their weight in the voting population would 
be dispersed.25 As a result, even large Democratic electoral majorities can result in 
state legislatures and a US Congress dominated by the Republicans.  
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Effective engagement in these elections also requires Democrats to be sensitive to 
the vast political differences and interests of the large republic that Madison envi-
sioned. Thus, an electable Democrat in North Dakota or Montana must be far more 
sympathetic to the interests of energy extractors and gun owners than the base of the 
political party, and the successful insurgent candidate in an urban district who empha-
sizes racial justice will be a prime target of Republican opponents across the country.  
Promises that mobilize an activist base, such as fixing the immigration system or 
providing national health care or reforming the tax system, stumble on the shores of 
political institutions designed to accommodate diverse interests without satisfying any 
of them. Importantly, the promises that mobilize the opposition to Trump, most nota-
bly the chimera of impeachment, are virtually impossible to achieve within the rules 
and institutions of American politics. 
 
 
6. The coalitional challenge 
 
Countermovements are generally composite affairs, and the anti-Trump movement 
is, if anything, more composite than most because of the breadth and diversity of its 
constituents and their concerns.  But does this breadth and diversity translate into a 
dispersed range of campaigns or into a cohesive coalition that centers on the outsized 
figure of its major target – Donald Trump?  
Some students of coalition formation see “crisis” as a catalyst for cooperation, and if 
that is true, the conditions are arguably right for an anti-Trump coalition to succeed. 
But Trump’s tendency to rapidly shift from one policy attack to another may impede 
activists’ capacity to combine different movement sectors (Reese, Petit and Meyer 
2010). Much will depend on the presence and capacities of inter-movement brokers to 
build bridges between these sectors and to fashion movement frames that transcend 
the interests and values of single sectors (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010, 202-3; 
Obach 2010, 202-3; Rose 2000). 
Even before Trump’s inauguration, women, environmentalists, immigrant rights ad-
vocates, scientists, lawyers, supporters of health care, ethnic and racial minorities – 
began to organize to oppose the assault on rights and regulations they expected to be 
coming (Fisher 2018). As the enormities of the Trump presidency became clear, pre-
existing groups, like Black Lives Matter and the LGBT movement, began to merge with 
the new groups that emerged from the election. Among the most surprising was the 
rise of a national movement of – of all things! – teenaged high school students, follow-




ing the shootings of 17of their fellow students and teachers in Parkland, Florida.26 
These young survivors of a mass shooting in a relatively affluent and well-funded 
school district made a concerted effort to mobilize their anger and experiences to 
change policy and influence turnout in the midterm elections. Savvy in the use of social 
media and supported by a well-resourced community, they commanded national at-
tention, organized a large demonstration in Washington, DC, and then set out to target 
the National Rifle Association and politicians whom it supported.  
A second strand of contention – the #MeToo movement – arose independently of 
Trump in the outrage over the sexual harassment of women by Producer Harvey Wein-
stein and other public figures. This too merged with the anti-Trump movement, first, in 
response to the new President’s history of denigrating women, and then during the 
Senate hearings over the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court. At this 
writing there are court cases in process on the part of a number of women – like adult 
film producer Stormy Daniels – against the President.  (Here too, there were contradic-
tory effects, since many conservative voters, convinced that the Democrats were using 
the accusations of sexual abuse against Kavanaugh for electoral purposes, claimed to 
have turned out to vote Republican in the midterm elections as a result.) 
The emerging Resistance had two main organizational conduits: new groups, like In-
divisible, that were formed out of ad hoc initiatives (Brooker 2018); and older ones, like 
the American Civil Liberties Union, that had been working for progressive causes for 
decades. This dichotomy could already be seen in the heterodox composition of the 
Women’s March. As Hahrie Han and Michelle Oyakawa write: “From groups like Swing 
Left to Flippable, Wall of Us to Indivisible, and People Power to Daily Action, the coun-
termobilization spawned a host of new networks, apps, and organizations” (2018, 231), 
many of them local and forming independently of the more visible national organiza-
tions  (Putnam and Skocpol 2018). 
The shock of Trump’s election also prompted a cascading set of responses by exist-
ing advocacy organizations that felt their agendas under attack in a new way (Putnam 
and Skocpol 2018). Indeed, the march was supported by a spectrum of existing organi-
zations, ranging from the electorally-oriented Emily’s List, to progressive trade unions 
like the SIEU, and the powerful civil liberties group, the ACLU. The convergence was 
mirrored at the local level too:  “Many women sitting on local civic organizations, asso-
ciations, and governing boards,” write Marie Berry and Erica Chenoweth, “also provid-
ed organizing capacity and experience that would prove crucial in organizing sister 
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marches in the coming weeks” (2018, 79). Even lawyers, whose activism is normally 
limited to the courtroom, emerged as prime actors in the Resistance, from their de-
fense of refugees at airports around the country in response to Trump’s travel ban in 
early 2017 (Dorf and Chu 2018) to fighting family separation at the border in 2018. 
Should we see the varied strands in the Resistance as an integrated movement or as 
a scattered array of diverse interests and claims? The major gravitational source that 
pulled the varied strands of the Resistance together was Trump and his continual as-
saults on immigrants, minority communities, the environment, and on the internation-
al rule of law. Trump offers these groups a focal point that keeps the varied elements 
of the resistance from careering off in different directions. But the very unpredictability 
of his initiatives can have an opposite effect: no sooner does a policy of his administra-
tion offer opponents a unifying target – for example, the separation of children from 
their illegally-immigrating parents in June, 2018 – then Trump marches off in a new di-
rection — like his embrace of Vladimir Putin at the Helsinki summit soon afterward.  
Much depends on the intersection of varied forms of activism and on how new and 
old groups manage their relations. When Fisher (2019) compared her survey of the 
Women’s March to other post-inauguration protests, the results showed hints of inter-
sectionality. She writes that 
 
People who were motivated by Racial Justice to participate in the March for  
Science reported being motivated by LGBTQ issues and Police Brutality; and  
people who were motivated by Racial Justice to participate in the People’s  
Climate March reported being motivated by Equality, Brutality, Religion and Social 
Welfare.27 
 
In their work on Latino mobilization, Chris Zepeda-Millán and Sophia Wallace found 
a similar duality. They argue:  
 
Because of the Trump administration’s simultaneous attacks on various mar-
ginalized groups, the president may be creating opportunities for the immigrant 
rights movement to forge more productive and meaningful intersectional and 




 Quoted from Fisher, “American Resistance,” 2019, in press. However, when Fisher analyzed the durabil-
ity of intersectional overlaps, she found that “the patterns are not durable across events, indicating the 
limitations of interpretations of the Resistance as a unified intersectional movement” (Fisher, Jasny, and 
Dow 2018, 1). 




These authors also found that groups organizing on behalf of the rights of African-
Americans, such as the Black Lives Matter movement and the NAACP, have increasingly 
also advocated for immigrant rights. “Groups such as the National Women’s Law Cen-
ter have also developed resources and called for actions to protect the rights of immi-
grant women”, they write (2018, 105). 
The challenge of maintaining some kind of unity among people who bring to their 
activism strong commitments to diverse issues is a major challenge. Likely the greater 
challenge, however, is to maintain a connection between the movement’s institutional 
and non-institutional wings. Much of the energy of the latter comes from young peo-
ple, former Sanders supporters, and racial minorities outraged at continued police bru-
tality. These groups often find it hard to ally with Democrats and non-profit groups that 
are more comfortable within the institutions of government and in mainstream poli-
tics. But that party can only win if it succeeds in holding onto a broad following, ranging 
from its solid African-American and Hispanic bases, to suburban middle-class inde-
pendents turned off by the volatility of the Trump phenomenon, to working-class vot-
ers who are hit by the costs of his trade policy and grow skeptical of populist campaign 
slogans that don’t lead to meaningful reforms. This takes us to the final challenge faced 
by the Resistance –what we call “the radicalization/institutionalization challenge.” 
 
 
7. The Challenge of Radicalization and Institutionalization 
 
As social movements develop, and particularly as they demonstrate signs of political 
influence, they are subjected to centrifugal pressures that lead the diverse factions that 
comprise a campaign to become more diverse and diffuse, focusing on distinct projects 
at the expense of unity. The American political system works to exacerbate such dis-
putes (Meyer 1993). The result is a bifurcation that often reinforces polarization be-
tween radicalization and institutionalization within a movement. Each move by one ac-
tor in a contentious conversation leads to an equal, or even more extreme move, often 
exacerbated by the indiscriminate reaction of the forces of order. Thus, after the pro-
tests of antiwar activists at the Chicago Democratic convention were brutally sup-
pressed by Mayor Daley’s police in 1968, some activists moved into a violent and clan-
destine underground. “Chicago,” argues Todd Gitlin, “confirmed that no centers were 
going to hold, no wisdom was going to prevail” (1987, 326).  Similarly, the intense 
clashes between police and protesters in Italy in 1968-69 led militant minorities to hive 
off into clandestine groups that chose the route of armed struggle (della Porta and Tar-
row 1986).  




The shift of thousands of activists into campaign activity during the 2018 midterm 
elections, while more outraged activists continued to protest in the streets and in the 
halls of Congress, provides a similar challenge. Most of the Resistance has been peace-
ful – in its public actions if not always in its rhetoric. But while many of the newly-
elected Democrats in Congress are moderates, the radical wing of the Resistance that 
helped to elect them may push them to overreach their fragile power. 
First, supporters of the Sanders candidacy, many of them convinced that their can-
didate was cheated out of the Democratic nomination by the Clinton forces, came out 
of the 2016 election spoiling for a fight, and tried to instill a radical current into the 
emerging Resistance. It also led to success in the victory of candidates like 28 year old 
democratic socialist Alexandria  Osorio-Cortez in a New York City primary. 
Second, in Washington, DC, Berkeley, California, and Portland, Oregon, small radical 
elements used the Inauguration to mount attacks and engage in vigorous, and some-
times violent, encounters with police (Berry and Chenoweth, 85). This “antifa” move-
ment clashed with the ultra-nationalist and openly racist right in Charlottesville, Virgin-
ia, in August, 2017, when an extreme nationalist group tried to organize a rally to op-
pose the removal of a local statue of General Robert E. Lee, a hero of the Confederacy 
in the Civil War. When a group of anti-fascist demonstrators showed up to oppose the 
rally, this led to violent clashes between the opposing groups. The episode ended when 
a radical rightist, James Alex Fields Jr., plowed his car into a group of counter-
protesters, killing a young woman, Heather Heyer, and wounding several others.28  The 
Charlottesville episode had immediate and longer-term political repercussions: imme-
diate, when President Trump opined that “there were good people on both sides,” and 
longer-term, when it led a number of other southern cities to remove statues of Civil 
War heroes. 
Third, during the conflict over the Kavanaugh nomination, thousands of women and 
others demonstrated against the Republicans’ attempt to force a compromised judge 
through Congress and produce a takeover of the Supreme Court. Those demonstrators 
were largely peaceful and polite –in the tradition of American women’s organizing – 
but their passion and their willingness to flood the halls of Congress allowed the GOP 
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and the president to portray them as advocates of “mob rule,” – just as Richard Nixon 
did in his presidential campaign.29  
But alongside radicalization there was an opposite result: the movement of larger – 
if less volatile – sectors of the movement into parties, interest groups, and the move-
ment press. There is a long history of sociological theorizing – beginning with Michels’ 
work on political parties (1962), and Zald and Ash’s landmark work on movement or-
ganizations (1966) that focuses on the process of “goal displacement”, in which an or-
ganization survives at the expense of the issues that initially gave rise to it. Indeed, we 
often see a high degree of displacement of radical goals in the latter stages of a protest 
cycle; but we also see a thrust of reformism coming from activists who have entered 
institutional frameworks. This is what happened within the Democratic Party following 
its disastrous national convention in 1968 that led to a tragic defeat at the polls months 
later (McAdam and Kloos 2014, ch. 4). 
It is far too soon to judge whether the Resistance will have a similar long-term effect 
on party politics, but as the 2018 midterm election approached, we already saw the in-
fluence of progressive groups on nominations to Congressional and state-level office. 
Figure Two, which is taken from a New York Times compilation of primary election en-
dorsements, shows that groups like the Justice Democrats, Our Revolution, the Work-
ing Families Party and the Progressive Change Campaign Committee have helped pro-
gressive candidates – many of them women – to enter, and often to win -- primary 
elections against more traditional Democrats.  
But opposing a popular president with his major support from a movementized 
Right will require a broader coalition, stretching from the progressive forces that came 
out of the Sanders campaign to the mainstream activists who supported Hillary Clinton.  
A revitalized Democratic Party could inspire those who envision something akin to a 
European Social Democratic or even Socialist Party, one that would support a strong 
welfare state and organized labor. But it terrifies others who envision exactly the same 
sort of party or, worse, undergoing defeat at the polls. The dilemma for the Democratic 
Party is whether to encourage the progressive currents in the Resistance that are trying 
to move the party to the left, or reach out to independent voters – especially suburban 
women – who are distressed at the outrages of Donald Trump and are looking for a 
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new home in institutional politics. The competing tendencies of institutionalization and 
de-institutionalization that emerged from Trump’s election have both entered the 
American party system. 
 
Figure 2 - House primary winners endorsed by at least one major insurgent group 
 
 
Source: Candidates endorsed by the Justice Democrats, Our Revolution, the Working Families Party and the Progres-
sive Change Campaign Committee; Associated Press. | Note: Special elections are not included. Race ratings are an 
average of ratings by The Cook Political Report, Inside Elections With Nathan L. Gonzales and the University of Virgin-
ia’s Center for Politics.  From Alexander Burns, “There is a Revolution on the Left; Democrats are Bracing,” The New 




Analyzing political contention on the fly, all conclusions must be provisional. We can 
do somewhat better with explaining the conjunction of forces and events that led to 
this moment than we can in predicting the ultimate outcome. The nationalist move-
ment Trump represents and encourages, and the Resistance it provoked, are unlikely 
to reach a conclusion as tidy and succinct even as the outcome of the 2018 midterm 
elections, which were ambiguous enough!  Although the major story following those 
elections was the dramatic shift towards the Democrats in many parts of the country, 
there was also a countervailing shift to the right in election districts that had supported 




Trump two years earlier. The 2018 elections may have marked a long-term shift to the 
left, but – for the moment – it reinforced the polarization of American politics.30 
The Trump phenomenon, we have argued, is best understood as a social movement, 
which gives Donald Trump enormous leverage within the Republican Party, which had 
initially accepted him as its leader with reluctance. That movement, we then argued, 
gave rise to a countermovement – the Resistance – which is locked into a sustained 
battle with its Trumpian counterpart. Trumpism is like European populism in some 
ways but it has behind it a half century of movementization at the base of the Republi-
can Party, whose main source is the racial resentment of white voters at the real and 
imagined disadvantages they suffer at the hands of minorities and those who represent 
them. Trump went further than any Republican politician in exploiting these grievanc-
es, but he did not invent them. 
Trump’s control of one of the two national parties means that the Resistance faces a 
double challenge: opposing a mobilized population at the base of the Republican party 
who maintain a direct relationship with its leader, and that party itself, which is fast 
becoming the institutional face of the movement. This double challenge has created 
two faces of the Resistance: the face that contests the excesses of Trumpism in the 
streets; and the face that contests Republican gains in the institutions of American poli-
tics. The first was the visible face of opposition during the first two years of the Trump 
presidency; the second is the face that opposed him in the midterm elections. How 
those two “faces” relate to each other is the major challenge of the opposition to the 
Trump presidency. 
Growing out of this central dilemma, the Resistance faces a number of specific chal-
lenges: how to handle the mix of opportunities and constraints that the American sys-
tem offers insurgent groups; how to manage a broad and heterogeneous coalition; and 
how to mediate between the conflicting peaks of institutionalizing and de-
institutionalizing actions. The American system both facilitates the creation of such co-
alitions at the gates of institutional politics (Tarrow 2012) but throws up enormous ob-
stacles to their success (Meyer 2015). 
This leads us to a final question: “What is the future of the citizen groups that were 
politicized by the election of Donald Trump and by the challenges his administration 
has created?” Here again, we are in the realm of speculation, but a look at the recent 
American past suggests that this will not prove to be a “flash movement” that fritters 
away its energies in endless debates or disappears into private life. Previous large epi-
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sodes of contention, including the civil rights, antiwar, and antinuclear movements led 
to narratives of frustration and burn-out, to be sure, but they also produced large 
numbers of people who were determined to find new and sustainable ways to advance 
their views (Corrigall-Brown 2012). If we focus only on the continuing street demon-
strations, their relative size, frequency, and civility, we will be missing a great deal of 
the action, which can only occur in the medium and long runs. 
Already, the apparently successful shift of Resistance energy from mass rallies to 
town hall meetings and electoral politics suggests that the movement is adding an in-
stitutional face to the dramatic street protests of 2017. In normal circumstances, Dem-
ocratic gains would lead to efforts at compromise and conciliation, moderating some of 
the worst Trumpian excesses and chilling the ardor of the mainstream Republicans who 
grabbed hold of his coattails after his early successes. Such a restoration is unlikely in 
the near future. 
It is a mistake to imagine a quick end to the extremely polarized politics and political 
divisions that characterize the Trumpian and anti-Trumpian moment. The forces that 
Trump exploited and those that he conjured up are unlikely to disappear with his pres-
idency. Encouraged and legitimated not only by the president of the United States, his 
supporters and enablers in positions of power across the country are as unlikely to give 
up in the face of defeat as is the Resistance. White nationalism, largely marginalized in 
past decades, has reemerged as a force that future governments will have to manage. 
Demographic changes may well defeat these forces at the polls, but we’ve learned that 
it doesn’t take majorities to influence the political agenda. 
We can imagine a future in which a revitalized Democratic Party, energized by the 
Resistance, develops the determination to use whatever means it can muster to 
achieve its policy goals, much as Trump’s Republican Party has done. This will make for 
a messy and divisive politics, in which institutional battles about politics and policy are 
punctuated by street demonstrations and social divisions. We can also imagine an al-
ternative, in which electoral victories from the Resistance encourage defections within 
the Republican Party, and a reinvigorated respect for the institutions of government. 
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